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China’s socialist rule of law is examined in this chapter in the context of the comprehensive deepening of reforms undertaken by the leadership of Xi Jinping. Both theoretical and empirical perspectives are used with special attention paid to two key and seemingly contradictory Party documents about political direction on the one hand, and the deepening legal reforms on the other hand. The first is the ‘Communiqué on the current state of the ideological sphere’. Issued by the General Office of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee (April 2013), the Party is urged to ‘guard against Western liberal-democratic ideals’.​[1]​ The second is the ‘Decision on Some Major Issues in the Comprehensive Promotion of Ruling the Country According to Law’.​[2]​ This was the first-ever plenary session devoted to legal issues, laying down the scope and guidelines for legal reform (CPC Central Committee 2014). These pivotal documents are set against the backdrop of major ideological and political trends in the Party-state. Some ‘market reforms’ are tolerated, yet other liberal reforms such as freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, free speech and so on are repressed. The chapter identifies the principal institutional and ideological gaps preventing the Party from embracing an independent and impartial rule of law.

The 4th Plenum Decision: a dashed hope for a rule of law breakthrough? 
The United Nations (2004) states that ‘rule of law’ in the contemporary world consists of three key principles: (1) The supremacy of law, with all persons, entities and institutions, including the State, being accountable to publicly promulgated laws; (2) equality before the law, with laws being equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and (3) consistency with international human rights norms and standards. This view of rule of law is concerned, not only with judicial procedures and other formal legal aspects, but also with the substantive contents of law. Rule of law in this sense is not narrowly confined to judicial issues, but is concerned with the fundamental issues related to the interrelations of law, politics and the broader social system.  

The CPC leadership has viewed law as essential to Party ideology since the beginning of the reform era, the late 1970s. Not least because the rule of man (人治) and lawlessness（无法无天）were identified as key factors contributing to the catastrophic ten years of the Cultural Revolution. In 1997, the political report delivered by Jiang Zemin to the 15th National Congress of the CPC ‘established socialist rule of law as a state objective’. In 1999, ‘ruling the country according to law and establishing a socialist rule of law state’ was inscribed as an amendment to the PRC’s Constitution. Since the 1990s, and for the first time in Chinese history, the legal discourse in China has clearly distinguished the rule of law (法治), whereby rulers are subject to and limited by law for justice and the protection of human rights, from rule by law (法制), where law is an instrumental ‘tool’, a stick to control the population by rulers who monopolize institutional power, and from rule of man. It has been convincingly argued in legal theories over time that rule of law and rule by law occupy a single continuum. But they are distinguishable concepts. They are distinguished, not by the inherent nature of law, but by the power-system in which laws respond and the power-structure through which institutional power is distributed among social groups. Holmes (2003) makes the general argument that an autocracy exists where one political force monopolizes institutional power and this entails rule by law rather than rule of law. This chapter argues that Holmes general description applies to contemporary China.

The ‘Decision on Some Major Issues in the Comprehensive Promotion of Ruling the Country According to Law’ 
The Decision pooled many proposals that had been forwarded in recent years for specific legal reforms and general improvements to rule of law. Three particularly salient reforms in the package are: (1) to reduce the intervention of court decisions by local Party and government officials (see Qianfan Zhang in Chapter 1); (2) the emphasis on legal professionalism, and (3) measures to protect the rights of citizens and defendants.

The package targeting local protectionism and intervention of local officials is part of the anti-corruption drive to address common mistrust of the Party-state/legal system nexus. To prevent the improper interference in court cases by officials, the Decision calls for the establishment of: ‘a system for recording, reporting and investigating the responsibility of instances wherein leading cadres interfere in judicial activities or get involved in the handling of certain cases … [and] the establishment of ‘circuit courts’ operating across jurisdictions’. 

In theory, these reforms aim to make courts less dependent on local political authorities at the same administrative level. At the same time, they attempt to curb local protectionism which is often applied at the expense of justice.

Reiteration of legal professionalism in the Decision represents a policy change that appears to reverse what liberal reformers have called a ‘retrogression’ in recent preceding years. For example, in the 1950s the CPC had established a practice of turning ex-servicemen into police, procurators and judges - even though they had no prior legal training. This situation was changed after the 1980s when the threshold was raised for legal personnel, requiring them to have some legal training - ideally at the tertiary education level. Senior positions, such as judges of higher courts, required sufficient legal qualifications and experience. Since the late 1990s, however, the appointment of ex-servicemen and other unqualified personnel as procurators and judges staged a comeback. As Minzner (2011: 935) put it, this sees ‘political loyalty being put above professional competence’. The Decision’s stress on professional qualifications and legal expertise, and the establishment of ‘gradual selection and progression systems for judges and prosecutors’, appears to signal a move towards legal professionalism.

The measures in the Decision to protect legal rights of citizens and defendants also warrants particular attention as the presumption of innocence is a new and fragile principle in China. Some authorities do not, at this stage, regarded it as a principle at all. A common practice gives extensive power to the police, procurators and Party disciplinary personnel authorized to detain and interrogate citizens without legal representation. This process has often, in the past, been accompanied by torture and blackmail (Ho 2012: 211-12). Guilty convictions have frequently been decided even before the case has been to court! Of the 1.16 million people put on trial in 2013, Chinese courts returned a guilty verdict for all but 825. This represents a 99.93 per cent conviction rate (McCoy 2014).​[3]​ Wang Cailiang, director of Beijing’s ‘Cailiang Law Firm’, referred to 2013 as ‘the darkest year in the history of China’s rule of law’ (cited in McCoy 2014). Indeed, between 2008 and mid-2013, nearly 150,000 were investigated for corruption alone and the acquittal rate was less than 0.1 percent. 
 
Decision guidelines, however, pledge to ‘promote structural reform in litigation, placing trials at the centre’. Facts and admissible evidence related to cases under investigation, examination and prosecution - must ‘stand the test of law’. Such guidelines seek to protect the innocent from punishment in cases where there is insufficient or reasonable doubt. The exclusion of illegal evidence such as ‘confessions extracted through torture’, is welcomed by jurists domestically and internationally. However, the Decision does not establish the supremacy of law; rather it insists on the ‘leading role’ of the Chinese Communist Party. This is enshrined as the number one principle in carrying out ‘rule of law’ in China. 

The Decision declares the supremacy of the Party as the defining feature of ‘rule of law with Chinese characteristics’ in three ways. First, it states that ‘the leadership of the Party is the most essential trait of socialism with Chinese characteristics and the most fundamental guarantee of socialist rule of law’. Second, the Decision allows the Party leadership to ‘penetrate the entire process and all aspects of ruling the country, with the socialist rule of law being a central element’. Third, the Decision insists that Party leadership is basic to socialist rule of law. That is, this is where the ‘foundations and the life-line of the Party and the State lie; the interests and happiness of the people of all ethnicities in the entire country are tied to it, and it is a proper element of moving the country according to the law forward’. 

The concern here is that the authority of the Party is placed above the law despite the Decision asserting repeatedly that ‘Party leadership and socialist rule of law are identical’. It adds that ‘socialist rule of law must persist in Party leadership, Party leadership must rely on socialist rule of law’. The Decision crystallizes the Party’s instrumental take on rule by law in that it is to serve its interests ‘in implementing Party leadership over the country and society through State political bodies’. In this view, the role of law must be good at utilizing democratic centralist principles ‘to safeguard the authority of the Centre, the unity of the entire Party and the entire country’. Ultimately, it follows that what the Decision really means is socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics equates to ‘rule of the Party, legitimized by law’.

The Party does not accept professional recommendations or popular demand for abolishing, or even reforming, its widely-denounced CPC Political-legal Committees. The CPC regards legal issues as political in nature. In this sense, Political-legal Committees, at both central and local levels, are required to oversee China’s entire government branch of law enforcement. This includes the domestic security apparatus and courts. The Committees enable the Party to take over these functions of government on any matter perceived to be ‘sensitive’. According to Zheng (1997: Chapter 1) this merely thwarts normal state-building in China.​[4]​ This institutional device gives the Party committee political and institutional control over the judicial apparatus, as well as the nomenclature through which all cadres (including judges) are appointed and managed by the Party (党管干部). Judicial independence is thus compromised. Handling legal cases according to legal principles and the integrity of the law - without prioritising the interests of the Party - is out of the question. Since the early 2000s there have been growing calls in both the legal profession and general public for Political-legal Committees to be abolished. This is especially so since Zhou Yongkang, China’s former ‘security tsar’, was brought down early in 2015 on charges of corruption, abuse of power and leaking state secrets. His political power had been based on his positions as Secretary of the Central Political-legal Committee and member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. In answering this particular call for change, however, the Decision has actually strengthened the Party’s control over law and legal institutions. It reaffirms that ‘political-legal committees are the organizational form through which Party committees lead political-legal work. This is to be maintained for the long term’, appearing to rule-out legal institutions acting impartially and independently of Party-leadership any time soon. 

The Decision reiterates that the country is to be ‘governed according to the constitution’ (see Hand in Chapter 2). This is a narrative intended to generate strong associations with constitutional rule, implying China has a spirit of constitutionalism. However, the current Chinese constitution does not clearly define state-society relations or central-local relations. Nor does it define the functions of the different branches of government, or stipulate constitutional remedies for its own violation. Rather than providing institutional limits on the untrammelled exercise of power, it is more typical of a Stalin-era constitution. A Stalinist constitution guarantees monopoly power of the ruling communist party. Essentially, it renders individual human rights meaningless. ‘Rights’ are conceived collectively and this Stalinist principle is repeated in the Decision. As it now stands, the current Chinese constitution is one of just two constitutions in the world that contains the expression ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ (Cao 2005). The other is North Korea. This classic communist definition comes from Lenin (1972) who held that ‘dictatorship’ means nothing other than power unlimited by any laws and based directly on the use of violence. Indeed, Mao (1938: 224) famously held that ‘every communist must grasp the truth; political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.​[5]​ If the Chinese leadership chooses to use a hard-line Maoist-Leninist interpretation of the preamble to the Chinese Constitution - about ‘the people’s democratic dictatorship’ and ‘the leadership of the Communist Party’ – there are no institutional impediments as to how that interpretation may be applied.

The reason this preamble clause remains a concern is the above interpretation is actively used in practice. For instance, under Xi’s leadership China has witnessed systematic deprivation of legal rights and suppression of dissenting groups such as rights lawyers, liberal intellectuals, internet advocates and, most recently, women’s rights activists. The criminal detention of human rights activists rose from 80 in 2012 to 233 in 2013 and then 442 in 2014.​[6]​ The administrative detention of human rights activists rose from 137 in 2012, to 224 in 2013, and 358 in 2014. In 2014, 11 rights lawyers were detained or imprisoned for ‘political crime’, including Pu Zhiqiang and Xu Zhiyang.​[7]​ Many liberal intellectuals and high profile NGO leaders previously tolerated by the security apparatus are no longer tolerated. For example, 70 year old journalist, Gao Yu, 81 year old writer, Tie Liu, and Transition Institute for Social Economic founder Guo Yushan, were all recently detained on the spurious charges of, respectively, ‘leaking state secrets’ (accused of sending Document No. 9 to an overseas website), ‘picking quarrels and provoking troubles’ and ‘illegal business activity’ (Chinese Human Rights Defenders 2015). Moderate Uyghur economics scholar, Ilham Tohti, was sentenced to life in prison after being charged with ‘separatism’ (Freedom House 2015). The comprehensive assault on internet activists and online opinion leaders, in the name of strengthening China’s ‘internet sovereignty’, has also been ruthless. In February 2014, Xi established the ‘Central Internet and Informatization Leading Group’ with himself as head and the prime minister and propaganda chief as deputy heads. The Xi leadership has not only removed content deemed as ‘political dissent’ from Weibo (a Chinese equivalent of Twitter), it has shut down Virtual Private Networks which had been used by Chinese netizens for accessing information blocked by Chinese authorities (i.e. the Great Fire Wall). This has been extended to blocking overseas Chinese websites and international web services such as Google, Facebook and Twitter. By silencing public intellectuals, NGO leaders, critical journalists, internet opinion leaders and other rights activists, the Xi leadership characterizes itself by stifling the embryonic, but vibrant, civil society that had emerged as the Party-state withdrew from some areas of the public sphere. 

Xi’s approach to rule of law is further reflected in the on-going anti-corruption campaign. Rather than using state legal institutions and formal legal processes to deal with economic crimes, Xi continues to rely on the extra-judicial mechanism of ‘shuanggui’ 双规run by the Party’s ‘Central Commission for Discipline Inspection’. The Commission operates at central and local levels to purge corrupt elements. However, in resorting to shuanggui, the Commission and its lower level counterparts can exercise power without legal restraint. This includes the power to detain suspects without due legal process, and put relatives or other associates of suspects under round-the-clock surveillance. The Commission can tap telephone conversations, access personal files held by any institution, summons anyone to give evidence, and, in certain circumstances, use torture and blackmail in interrogation. Indeed, ‘discipline inspection’ can be very effective in taking down corrupt officials, including senior officials in the domestic security apparatus and People’s Liberation Army. As the earlier statistics show, criminal prosecutions rarely fail. The argument for shuanggui is that corruption in such powerful state-owned enterprises and state regulators requires commensurate power to overcome it. But this is a shallow argument as the extra-judicial power has the negative side-effect of damaging legal institutions, including central tenets of rule of law. No legal or procedural assurances are provided that protect the rights of suspects and prevent the abuse of power. At the heart of these concerns is that selective law enforcement can result in the persecution of political rivals rather than punish criminals. Indeed, the anti-corruption campaign has been accompanied by a crackdown on independent activists, such as lawyers seeking a system of asset disclosure by public officials and a measure of judicial independence in line with standards in virtually all developed countries. 

The words and deeds of the Xi leadership thus far, have strengthened the ‘system of stability preservation’ (维稳体制). The ‘system of stability preservation’ has taken shape in China against a backdrop whereby communist Party-states had lost their ideology-based legitimacy, including the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe. This system consists of measures to preserve the CPC regime ‘in the name of maintaining social stability’ (Feng 2013: 21). The thesis of the Chinese government is that China can succeed in economic development only under conditions of stability and only the one-party rule of the CPC can ensure stability. Guided by militant slogans such as ‘stability overrides everything’ and ‘nipping every element of instability in the bud’, stability preservation extends the authority of the Party-state organs over the security and propaganda apparatuses in particular. These are central to ‘preserving stability’ and do so by suppressing grievances and dissent, legally or otherwise. Previous administrations have relied on extra-legal measures such as the administrative punishment regime ‘Re-education-Through-Labor’, ‘black jails’ to detain petitioners, the detention and interrogation system of shuanggui, and comprehensive media censorship. Despite some procedural improvements (see Chen in Chapter 6), what is new is that whilst most extra-legal practices are continued, the current crackdown on political and ideological dissent is presented as occurring through formal legal processes. 

Document No. 9: back to a totalitarian framework or merely a regression? 
Document No. 9 refers to the ‘Communique on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere’, an internal document circulated within the Party by the General Office of the Central Committee in April 2013. The Communique criticizes neoliberalism for overstating the role of the free market and downplaying the role of regulation and central government oversight. It questions whether ‘opening up’ and ‘going out’ reforms have gone too far and warns that Western anti-China forces and domestic dissidents are trying to ‘split the nation’ by fostering the type of color revolutions that led to the overthrow of authoritarian regimes in the former Soviet Republics.​[8]​ Document No. 9 and Xi’s more recent speeches about ideological dangers, theoretically locates ‘socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics’ as primarily political and ideological. It directly relates to a strategy for regime survival. Viewed from this perspective, the economic and legal development reforms, and recent repressive measures taken under the guise of maintaining ‘social harmony’, are designed to strengthen communist rule in China.   

When Xi commenced as General Secretary of the CPC in November 2012, he signalled his determination to strengthen the entire Party’s ‘communist faith’, as well as ‘self-confidence about the path, the theory and the system’.​[9]​ It was in the context of Xi’s speeches and instructions that the Central Office of the CPC Central Committee, headed by Xi’s confidante, Li Zhanshu, issued the now infamous Document No. 9 to guide the ideological and propaganda work of the Party.

Document No. 9 refers to the ‘acute struggle in the ideological sphere’, identifying seven ideological dangers posing serious threats to the survival of the communist regime, as follows: 

	propagating Western constitutionalist democracy, with an attempt to reject the present leadership of the Party and to negate the political system of socialism with Chinese characteristics; 
	propagating ‘universal values’, with an attempt to shake the ideological and theoretical basis for Party rule; 
	propagating civil society, with an attempt to deconstruct the social basis for Party rule; 
	propagating neo-liberalism, with an attempt to change our country’s basic economic system; 
	propagating Western concept of press freedom and challenging our country’s principle and system that the Party manages the media; 
	propagating historical nihilism, with an attempt to deny the history of the Chinese Communist Party and the history of the New China; 
	challenging reform and opening up, and 
	challenging the socialist nature of socialism with Chinese characteristics. 

The above narrative about ‘propagating threats and challenges’ is based on an assessment that Western anti-China forces and domestic dissidents ‘incessantly carry out infiltration activities in the People’s Republic, and that Western anti-China forces pressuring us to change will not change’. Document No. 9 says the ‘spearhead of Westernization, separation and “color revolutions” is pointed at us always’. Such a vitriolic, almost paranoid narrative, is an attempt to legitimize the tasks Document No. 9 sets the entire Party:

To strengthen its leadership over ideological work at all levels. It is intended to guide Party members and cadres in clearly distinguishing theoretical right and wrong and forbidding opinions that violate the Party’s theory, discourses that violate the Party Centre’s decisions, and discourses that vilify the image of the Party and the State; to persist unwaveringly in the principle that the Party manages the media; and to realistically strengthen management of the ideological battlefield, to ensure that everyone is responsible to protect the territory, and everyone fulfils their responsibility to protect the territory, strengthening online public opinion guidance, and cleaning up the online public opinion environment.
(General Office of the CPC Central Committee 2013)

The themes of Document No. 9 have been repeated many times in Xi’s 2013 speeches. For instance, his speech 2013 June at the ‘Organizational Work’ (组织工作) conference reiterates:






	A good cadre has the spiritual strength of revolutionary faith higher than the heaven, whereas those cadres sceptical of communism dare not sheathe sword when facing major matters of principle, such as the leadership position of the Party or socialist system is under threat.
 (ibid.)

 His August 2013 speech at the National Conference on ‘Propaganda and Ideological Work’ details instructions to the Party in more militant language. ‘Propaganda and ideological work’ was stated to be extremely important work of the Party with more specific tasks identified as follows: 

Daring to sheathe sword; launching a public opinion struggle to set a clear line between right and wrong; forbidding any space in newspapers, journals, lectures, forums, conferences, films, televisions, radios and theatres for discourse that attacks the leadership position on the Party and socialist system, distorts the history of the Party and our country, spread rumours and provoke controversies;  blocking this kind of discourse on new media such as online newspapers and journals, websites, mobile phones messaging, WeChat, blogs, and Weibo; punishing by law anyone who dares to stir up troubles; taking the Internet as the principal battlefield and winning the public opinion war which is of vital importance to ideology security and regime security; resolutely resisting change in public opinion guidance by the Party; integrating propaganda and ideology work closely with administrative management and social management; and strengthening the battlefield consciousness in propaganda and ideology to defend ideological territory with strongest sense of mission and upmost efforts. 
(Xi 2013b). 
 
Xi’s orders have been strictly carried out by the Party since then with a principal focus on the internet and universities. These were identified by the Party as the two most vulnerable links for ideological infiltration by hostile forces at home and abroad. Blogs and micro blogs have been hardest hit. The nation-wide ‘Internet Cleaning-up Campaign’ (净网行动) has resulted in dissenting blogs being shut down and postings blocked or deleted. 

In the second half of 2013, a protracted crackdown was directed against online celebrities and opinion leaders who had become known as ‘Big Vs’ (i.e. verified celebrity, or VIP users). Many were removed from the internet. For example, venture capitalist and prominent social-media commentator Charles Xue, who had 12 million followers, was spuriously charged with engaging a prostitute. In an act of ‘killing the chicken to frighten the monkeys’, he was on 15 September 2013 paraded on national TV in a prison vest and handcuffs to confess his crimes. In tactics reminiscent of Cultural Revolution ‘struggle sessions’, his confession focused specifically on the dangers of ‘spreading irresponsible posts online and violating the law’ rather than the actual charges made against him (Patience 2013). Also in September 2013, the Supreme Court and the Supreme Procuratorate jointly issued new regulations imposing jail sentences for the publication of ‘harmful information’. Information is deemed to be ‘harmful’ if re-posted more than 500 times. 

Showcasing the seriousness of the new rule, the state’s media outlets widely reported the case of a 16-year-old middle-school student detained on the charge of ‘posting a false message’. Her message had simply been re-posted more than 500 times. Moore (2014) subsequently found ‘the number of posts on the hugely successful Twitter-like microblog fell by as much as 70 per cent in the wake of the aggressive campaign to intimidate influential users’. Moore adds that ‘a once incalculably important public space for news and opinion - the country’s most free-flowing river of information that censors struggled to contain - had been reduced to a wasteland of celebrity endorsements, government propaganda and corporate jingles’ (ibid.). The coordinated crackdown has denied the ‘Big Vs’ and other opinion leaders any media agenda-setting influence, and Weibo as a forum for political debate and source of information. This has caused an exodus of users towards WeChat, which is a more private communication forum.

Tightening control over the tertiary education sector also started in the second half of 2013, escalating in 2014. One month after the internal circulation of Document No. 9, the CPC Central Organization Department, the CPC Central Propaganda Department and the Ministry of Education jointly issued a circular identifying 16 ways to strengthen the ideological and political education of young academics in universities.​[10]​ Chillingly similar to Mao-style ideological and political campaigns of the 1960s, the circular accused some universities of being ‘incubators of anti-Party thought’ and published this in state media. This was followed by a ban on advocacy of constitutional governance (宪政) and the dismissal of some out-spoken scholars, for example, Beijing University professor Xia Yeliang, China University of Politics and Law lecturer Teng Biao, and East China University of Politics and Law lecturer Zhang Xuezhong. 

In October 2014, Xi (2014a) encouraged campus Party committees to ‘sharpen ideological controls and purge antiparty elements, [and] never allow eating the Communist Party’s food and then smashing the Communist Party’s cooking pots’. In December 2014, the Party Centre convened a work conference on ‘Party-building in Higher Education’, at which Xi (2014b) urged universities to ‘enhance guidance over thinking and keep a tight grip on leading ideological work in higher education’. Following Xi’s instructions, the General Office of the CPC Central Committee and General Office of the State Council, issued a joint decree to guide the ideological battle in higher education institutions. It states that higher education propaganda and ideology work is: ‘an urgent strategic task of, the management of the higher education propaganda and ideology battlefield to strengthen Party leadership over higher education propaganda and ideology work and insert the Party ideology into textbooks, classrooms and minds’ (The General Office of the CPC Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council 2015).
 
In the weeks that followed this decree, many tertiary education sector administrators published pledges of allegiance to the Party in various State media outlets. China's education minister, Yuan Guiren, went so far as to demand ‘universities and colleges [should] never let textbooks promoting western values appear in our classes’ (Xihua 2015a).

The ideological campaign launched by Xi reflects CPC ideology. The current generation of the CPC leadership, brought up in Mao’s era and joining the communist bureaucracy under the post-totalitarian, reform era regime, have had their worldviews framed by an amalgam of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought (Feng 2011). Even through the opening up period of ‘market socialism’, the CPC has systematically used education, mass media, mass campaigns and other means to indoctrinate the population through its discourse on truth: that is that laws governing human society, and the trajectory of Chinese history legitimize the mission of the CPC, with the Party as the embodiment of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, the highest form of truth and knowledge. 

This meta-narrative holds that the Chinese, with its unique civilization and 5000 year history, have been humiliated by Western powers for more than a century. The theory is that only under the leadership of the CPC can the Chinese nation stand up to Western hegemony, maintain unity and stability, pursue China's modernization and ensure economic prosperity. Constitutional democracy in this discourse is presented as an institutionalization of regular elections, independent judiciary and political and civil rights - features that are merely bourgeois affectations. It is only the ‘proletarian dictatorship’ (or ‘people’s democratic dictatorship’) under the leadership of the Party that is ‘genuine’ democracy. In this ideology, the Party represents the interest of the people and serves the people and Document No. 9 reflects precisely this ideology in the contemporary era.

Under conditions of market socialism since 1978 and especially in the 1990s, tremendous efforts have been made to emphasize patriotism and the theory of ‘building socialism with Chinese characteristics’ whilst obscuring  the tenets of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought on the themes of class struggle and communist ideals. With the collapse of communist regimes around the world and consequent loss of ideological credibility, the CPC faced a serious crisis of legitimacy and uncertainty as to direction. The upgrading of patriotic education, in association with rapid economic development, provided the new ‘performance legitimacy’ to one-party rule. Performance legitimacy was embodied in the ‘Theory of Three Represents’, the ‘Concept of Scientific Development’ and the ‘Patriotic Education Campaign’. These theoretical innovations were a response to a new global reality. The class-struggle narrative targeting domestic people’s enemies (exploiting classes), gave way to a patriotic narrative targeting foreign ‘hostile forces’. Again, the emphasis of that legitimizing narrative is reflected in Document No. 9. 

Xi’s rein has clearly tightened social and political controls and renewed political indoctrination, moral purification and ideological struggle. Xi’s rhetoric of the ‘China Dream’ promises a stronger and wealthier China at the CPC’s 100th anniversary in 2021 and 100th anniversary of the PRC in 2049. The so-called China Dream echoes a nationalistic theme of state ideology. In Document No. 9, however, Xi’s attack on any hopes for a constitutional democracy, civil society and universal rights represents a retrogression and perhaps worse. In terms of China’s long march towards rule of law, it is concerning that Xi warns that the ‘political and legal battlefront’ (政法战线) is to ensure ‘the handle of the knife’ (刀把子) is firmly in the hands of the Party and the people’ (Xinhua 2015b). Xi’s use of this Maoist metaphor in particular follows a tradition from Lenin to Stalin to Mao that places the police, procuratorate and courts (公检法) as ‘dictatorship organs’ (专政机关), with the authority to suppress political dissent - as if it were a crime. Upholding justice is thus reinscribed. 





The CPC’s current law reform agenda serves three main purposes. First, to enhance the power of the Party, indicated by Document No. 9, and the overarching principle of ‘Party leadership’ in the Decision. The Decision guarantees the Party power to control legal procedure and outcomes of cases deemed to have ‘political significance’. Measures to exercise greater central control over local courts also concentrate power in the Party Centre. Second, to boost economic growth by instilling greater public faith in China’s legal system and facilitating better legal protection for the socialist market economy’s operations. Third, to improve the image of the Party with the masses by countering local protectionism, reducing corruption of the court system at grassroots level, and upholding justice in ordinary legal proceedings that do not have overt political implications. The CPC views one-party autocracy as the defining feature of socialism. The authority of the constitution and law are essentially subject to the authority of the Party. The Party narrative on law reform is primarily to reinforce the legitimacy of the current political system. Just as ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’ means communist autocracy with Chinese characteristics, ‘rule of law with Chinese characteristics’ means rule by law under the CPC.  











^1	 Notes 	An English translation is at: http://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation.
^2	  	This was promulgated by the 4th Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the CPC in October 2014.
^3	  	See McCoy, T. (11 March 2014) ‘China scored 99.9 per cent conviction rate last year’, The Washington Post,	at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/03/11/china-scored-99-9-percent-conviction-rate-last-year/. McCoy (ibid.) cites the report of Zhou Qiang, head of the Supreme People’s Court, delivered to the National People’s Congress in March 2014 admitting that ‘rulings in some cases were not fair… which harmed the interests of the litigants and undermined the credibility of the law’. The pronouncement taps into a wider debate occurring inside China over the future of the PRC’s judicial branch, historically marred by corruption and political infighting. Shen Deyong, the executive vice-president of the Supreme People’s Court, wrote in the People’s Court Daily (2013) that ‘it’s preferable to release someone wrongfully, than convict someone wrongfully. If a true criminal is released, heaven will not collapse, but if an unlucky citizen is wrongfully convicted, heaven will fall’.
^4	  	In exploring the tensions between the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese state institutions, Zheng (1997) takes a neo-institutionalist approach in suggesting the Party faces an institutional dilemma: ‘It cannot live with the state, and it cannot live without the state’. For Zheng, it is not only conceptually constructive, but analytically imperative to distinguish the Chinese state from the Communist Party (see Chapter 1). 
^5	  	See Mao Zedong (6 November 1938) in ‘Problems of War and Strategy’, Selected Works, Vol. II.  What Mao then went on to say was that ‘our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party’ (ibid). 
^6	  	Murray, Lisa (2015) ‘China records worst year for human-rights detainees since 1990s’, Financial Review, at: http://www.afr.com/news/world/china-records-worst-year-for-humanrights-detainees-since-1990s-20150318-1m2803. Murray further reports that China detained 955 human rights activists in 2014, almost as many as the previous two years combined, making it the worst year for such advocacy since the mid-1990s. The detentions came in a turbulent year for rights activists as China marked the 25th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square ‘incident’ and thousands of protestors took to the streets in Hong Kong to push for greater democracy.
^7	  	Li, Z. & McKenzie, D. (7 May 2014) ‘Crackdown on dissent ahead of Tiananmen Square 25th anniversary’ CNN at: http://edition.cnn.com/2014/05/07/world/asia/china-pu-zhiqiang-detention/
^8	  	Document No. 9 describes the ideological situation in China as ‘complicated’, warning of the dangers of promoting Western liberal democracy, constitutionalism, rule of law, universal human rights, freedom of the press and civil society on the grounds that these ‘false ideological trends’ undermine Party leadership. 
^9	  	In a series of internal speeches in December 2012, Xi reflects on the collapse of the USSR and reminded the Party that ‘the belief in Marxism, socialism and communism is the political soul of the Party’. According to his interpretation, vacillation of belief and faith led to the situation where ‘no one was manly enough to defend the Soviet Union…. [adding] Why did the Soviet Union disintegrate? Why did the Soviet Communist Party collapse? An important reason was that their ideals and beliefs had been shaken. In the end, the ruler's flag over the city tower changed overnight. It's a profound lesson for us! To dismiss the history of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Communist Party, to dismiss Lenin and Stalin, and to dismiss everything else is to engage in historic nihilism, and it confuses our thoughts and undermines the Party's organizations on all levels’ (Xi 2012).
^10	  The CPC Central Organization Department, the CPC Central Propaganda Department and the Ministry of Education 2013.
^11	  Social contract theory refers to the Enlightenment theories of Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau, and others whereby an agreement is entered into by individuals that results in the formation of the state, or of organized society, the prime motive being the desire for protection, which entails the surrender of some or all personal liberties, at: http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Social+contract+theory.
^12	  This defines the state as ‘a machine for maintaining the rule of one class over another’ or ‘simply a machine for the suppression of one class by another’ (Engels 1990; Lenin 1964).
^13	  David Shambaugh (2015) uses the term ‘end game’ in relation to Xi Jinping’s ruthless measures bringing China closer to a ‘breaking point’. See Shambaugh, D. ‘The Coming Chinese Crackup: The endgame of communist rule in China has begun, and Xi Jinping’s ruthless measures are only bringing the country closer to a breaking point’, The Wall St Journal, 6 March 2015.
